In almost every free country in the world similar laws exist to protect the privacy of all your communication, including e-mails. In reality, however, these regulations are violated every day, by snoopy family members, the sys op in your corporate network, or by state-run systems like the notorious US's Echelon interception network. Furthermore, mails can be manipulated on all network nodes between your sending and the receiving machine.
To protect your privacy or your company's secret stuff, you can
Three different Internet Standards have been defined to accomplish these tasks:
The first two standards build on top of the GnuPG (or the commercial well-known PGP) application, which uses pairs of public and private keys for encrypting and signing. Please see the excellent GnuPG MiniHOWTO for further details. The S/MIME standard builds on a chain of certificates like e.g. TLS (RFC2246).
Using RFC 3156, complete messages are put into special "containers" (MIME types multipart/signed or multipart/encrypted) and signed and/or encrypted. This means that even the message structure itself (if the message contains attachments) as well as all attachments are protected and (in the encrypted case) hidden. Mail User Agents (MUAs) which support this standard include Sylpheed, Evolution, KMail, Mutt and Mozilla with the Enigmail plugin.
RFC 2633 or S/MIME basically uses the same MIME structures, although they may be named differently (besides multipart/signed, application/pkcs7-mime is used for encrypted and sometimes for signed messages). The main difference to the GnuPG methods is that you need a certificate which has been signed by a Certificate Authority (CA). When receiving messages, you don't check the key trust itself but whether you trust the signing certificate or not. While for "normal" users the GnuPG/PGP key "web of trust" is usually more efficient, S/MIME is frequently used in big companies or government environments. S/MIME can also be used in conjunction with stuff like smartcards, adding an other layer of security. MUAs supporting S/MIME are inter alia Evolution, Mozilla and all applications supporting the Ägypten Sphinx plugins like KMail and Mutt.
RFC 2440 is an older protocol which uses GnuPG to sign and/or encrypt only a message part. Usually all attachments are transmitted unprotected, and it is not possible to protect the message structure itself. Therefore, this protocol should be used only if necessary, i.e. if the receiving MUA does not understand the more sophisticated modern protocols above. MUAs supporting RFC 2440 include pine with pgp4pine and Micro$oft Outlook with the GData GnuPG Plugin.
At this point it should be noted that the "message envelope" (subject, date etc.) is not protected by any of these protocols. Therefore, they could still be manipulated by an attacker and of course be read by everyone (think of a letter's envelope).
Since the release of Balsa version 2.2.6 which in turn requires gmime version 2.1.9 or newer, crypto support for Balsa is again fully functional. With some additional libraries and applications installed, Balsa 2.3 supports all three aforementioned crypto protocols.
Balsa's support for OpenPGP (RFC 2440) and PGP/MIME (RFC 3156) and for S/MIME (RFC 2633) needs different additional software to be installed on your system, so the installation is split up into an OpenPGP and a S/MIME section. Please read both sections if you plan to use all three protocols as some stuff overlaps. You might also want to skip forward to the section Caching Passphrases below to check if you want to use it (which in turn needs most of the the Prerequisites for S/MIME Support to be installed).
If you want to sign and/or encrypt messages with GnuPG/PGP keys, you need to install in this order (Note: the versions given reflect the status of May 6th, 2006):
|Note: gpgme version 1.1.2 is broken, as the gpgme-config script does not emit the proper information for using a pthread-safe version of gpgme (see this discussion). To compile balsa|
I also recommend to install all additional software needed for gpgsm, as Balsa 2.3 (unlike Balsa 2.0) does not have an internal passphrase cache any more. If you install gpg-agent (which is mandatory for S/MIME support) you get a much more secure cache for all applications using gpg or gpgsm. Please see the S/MIME prerequisites section below for details.
For S/MIME support, you will need GpgSM which is the S/MIME counterpart to gpg developed in the Ägypten project. It depends on a lot of other applications and libraries, so the installation is not completely trivial. The following list summarises the necessary stuff in the recommended installation order. Remember that you will need additional software if you want to add e.g. Smartcard support (Note: the versions given reflect the status of May 6th, 2006):
./configure <your favorite config options> --with-gpgme[=<gpgme configure script>]If you installed gpgme in a standard path, just giving --with-gpgme should be sufficient. Otherwise, add the full path of the gpgme configure script, like --with-gpgme=/opt/crypto/gpgme-latest/bin/gpgme-config.
If you additionally want to have S/MIME support, add --enable-smime to the configure options. Please note that Balsa's S/MIME support is still experimental.
Then re-build and re-install Balsa as usual.
If you want to add more security to the applications installed above (or earlier), in particular gpg*, gpgsm, gpg-agent, and pinentry*, you may change their permissions to SUID root. In this case, they will use unswappable memory for all sensitive information, thus avoiding traces on swap space.
The configuration options for gpg are taken from the file ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf (new style, preferred) or ~/.gnupg/options (old style, depracted, and used only if ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf is not present). A reasonable setup which works well with keyservers and uses gpg-agent to ask for passphrases and to cache them (see section Caching Passphrases below) should have the following lines:
force-v3-sigs escape-from-lines lock-once keyserver wwwkeys.pgp.net keyserver-options honor-http-proxy,auto-key-retrieve use-agentIf you don't want to install a passphrase cache remove or comment out the last line. If your machine has no permanent connection to the internet, you might want to remove auto-key-retrieve from keyserver-options to prevent gpg from triggering a dial-in each time it hits an unknown key. Please see the gpg info page for further information about the config options.
Please note that Seahorse tweaks this file directly, so you should avoid changing this file manually if you use Seahorse.
Gpg-agent and pinentry are controlled by the config file ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf. In this file, you tell them how long they should cache passphrases, which pinentry binary gpg-agent calls, and that it should also manage certificate trusts (please use the right path and pinentry binary):
default-cache-ttl 3600 pinentry-program /usr/bin/pinentry-gtk-2 allow-mark-trustedPlease see the gpgsm info pages for details about the options of the agent.
Usually, you want to launch the agent automagically when you log in. To this end, add the statements
eval `gpg-agent --daemon -s` echo $GPG_AGENT_INFO > $HOME/.gpg-agent-infoto a file Gnome (or X) reads at startup, e.g. $HOME/.xsession (note that this may depend on your distribution). This statement should set and export the environment variable GPG_AGENT_INFO properly and write it's value into a file in the user's home folder. If you want to use the gpg agent also when when running gpg and friends from a terminal or the console, you should add
if [ -z "$GPG_AGENT_INFO" ] ; then if [ -f $HOME/.gpg-agent-info ] ; then export GPG_AGENT_INFO=$(cat .gpg-agent-info) fi fi export GPG_TTY=$(tty)to your $HOME/.bashrc which ensures that it will be found and called with the correct tty setting.
Remember that the gpg agent will not be shut down when you exit your Gnome (or other X) session. To kill it automatically in this case, I added to the gdm config file /etc/X11/gdm/PostSession/Default
GPGAGENTINFO="$HOME/.gpg-agent-info" if [ -f $GPGAGENTINFO ] ; then AGENTPID=$(cat $GPGAGENTINFO | sed -e 's/^[^:]*://' -e 's/:.*//') if [ -n "$AGENTPID" ] ; then kill -TERM $AGENTPID > /dev/null 2>&1 fi rm -f $GPGAGENTINFO fiNote that you will need to tweak other files when you are using a different dsiplay manager.
Please see also the gpg info page coming with gpg 1.9.x (node "Invoking GPG-AGENT") for further details about the proper installation of the agent.
GpgSM preferences — GpgSM's preferences are taken from the file ~/.gnupg/gpgsm.conf. Usually, the defaults are just fine, but for testing purposes it might be convenient to disable the CRL (Certificate Revocation List) checks. To this end, add the line
disable-crl-checksto this file. Please remember to remove it again when you use gpgsm in a production environment. Please see the gpg info page coming with gpg 1.9.x for further details.
S/MIME Key — Due to the nature of S/MIME, you can not simply create a key pair and start as you did (did you?) with gpg/pgp keys. You can get a key from several CA's; I got mine for free from Thawte. As they usually provide keys only for e.g. Mozilla, you have to use openssl to insert them into your gpgsm key rings. Matthias Welwarsky wrote a nice Small HowTo on how to import freemail S/MIME certificates into GPGSM about this.
Which mode you should use basically depends on the mail client the recipient uses (balsa, of course, knows about all standards). To check which standard the recipient's mail client supports, you could ask her/him to send you a signed message. If balsa tells you in the signature info box that it is a "PGP signature" the sender used GnuPG MIME mode. If it says that it is a "S/MIME signature" the mode is (surprise) S/MIME. Finally, if it reports that the part is "inline OpenPGP signed" the mode is pure RFC 2440.
You should also keep in mind that both GnuPG MIME mode (RFC 3156) and S/MIME mode (RFC 2633) sign and/or encrypt complete messages including all attachments (all parts are first put into a special MIME structure which is then handled, see the next section for an example). So usually these modes are the preferred standards for the secure exchange of messages.
In OpenPGP mode only the first part of the message will be signed and/or encrypted. All other parts are attached "as is". So, if you want to have signed/encrypted attachments here, you must first process them manually using gpg or Seahorse. Balsa will pop up a warning when you try to send a message with attachments in this mode.
The top-level part of the message (1) is a PGP/MIME container, of which the signed matter is again a multipart/mixed container (1.1), and the signature of it is good and trusted (1.2). The message itself (i.e. what Balsa will show you) consists of two "normal" parts (1.1.1 and 1.1.5) and three forwarded messages (1.1.2, 1.1.3 and 1.1.4). The first message is a PGP/MIME signed and encrypted multipart created by Enigmail, using the combined signing and encryption method (126.96.36.199). The second message contains a S/MIME signed part (188.8.131.52.1.1) of which the related certificate is not trusted (184.108.40.206.1.2). Note that this message also contains a part (220.127.116.11.2) which is not protected by this signature. The third message contains only one OpenPGP signed message part (18.104.22.168), whose signature is valid, but the key has expired. Therefore, this part gets a "bad" sign, and the overall signature status is also bad.
If the top-level part of a message or an included (forwarded) message is signed, the short status is also printed in the message's headers box.
Balsa can be configured to decrypt messages and check signatures automatically when a message is opened (see section Mailboxes below). It is however possible to decrypt or validate a message manually using the check crypt button in the messages top-level headers box. Note that if a message (like the example above) contains a forwarded encrypted message, re-checking its signature will always fail. This is due to the fact that the signature (1.2) has been calculated over the encrypted message part (22.214.171.124), but Balsa uses the decrypted contents upon re-checking. However, this is a very exotic case.
If a message's GPG signature could not be verified due to a missing key, you can run gpg in background to retreive the key from a keyserver. Balsa will report a successful retreival or indicate any error. If the retreival has been successful, use the recheck button as described above.
Pure OpenPGP signed and/or encrypted messages contain no information in the envelope, so it is not possible to display an indicator in the index. When an OpenPGP signed message is opened, the signature status displayed next to the respective message text part.
Balsa can not handle OpenPGP (RFC 2440) encrypted attachments with other content types than "text". To decrypt such attachments, save them to disk and use gpg or seahorse directly.
Some ancient mail clients still send messages with an "application/pgp" content header. This content type has been withdrawn at least since October 1996 when RFC 2015 (which in turn was updated by RFC 3156) was published. It is not and will never be supported by balsa. You should ask the sender of that mail to upgrade to an up-to-date client (balsa, of course ;-)).
If you already have gpg 1.9.x and all supporting packages installed, e.g. because you want to use S/MIME which needs gpgsm included there, balsa should simply use the agent and call pinentry to get a passphrase when necessary. Please see sections Gpg Setup and Gpg-Agent and Pinentry Setup above for details.
If you want to use the agent and pinentry without GpgSM support, please follow the installation instructions in section Prerequisites for S/MIME Support above, with the following two exceptions:
To simplify the exchange of public keys, you can send and receive them from keyservers. Check out www.pgp.net for further details. To use keyservers with gnupg, you should configure gpg as described in section Gpg Setup.
Now you can send a key to the keyser using the command
gpg --send-keyor search for public keys using
gpg --search-keys <mail address to search for>If you are located behind a firewall which blocks port 11371, this method will fail. In this case, you might still use a web interface a import or export keys to/from gpg using the --import or --export --armor options, respectively.
If you usually use Gnome-2 tools, it might be a good idea to convert the passphrase to UTF-8, using the following method:
gpg --edit-key '<ID of your private key>' passwdand enter a temporary new passphrase containing only US-ASCII characters;